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The book’s last two chapters, by William Hasker and Derk Pereboom, 
do not pertain strictly speaking to Molinism but are nonetheless quite 
engaging. Pereboom defends hard determinism, with its denial of moral 
desert as a fundamental kind, as an option for Christians. Pereboom dem-
onstrates that determinists have a lot of resources for making sense of 
praise, blame, guilt, and repentance. He reminds us that many theodicies, 
including Hick’s soul-making account or Marilyn Adams’s account of the 
value of identification with Christ, do not require a strong doctrine of free 
will. Perbeoom’s challenge deserves careful response from the defenders 
of libertarian free will.
Wiliam Hasker argues, quite convincingly by my lights, for the supe-
riority of a “general-policy” theodicy to a “specific-benefit” theodicy in 
accounting for “natural evils” (pain, suffering and death, including that 
of non-human and even pre-human creatures). He also raises legitimate 
questions about the epistemological consequences for ordinary human ac-
tion of the skeptical theist strategy. However, I am puzzled by Hasker’s 
assumption that a general-policy theodicy is unavailable to those, like Mo-
linists, Thomists, or theological determinists, who believe in meticulous 
Providence. Hasker seems to overlook the possible application to God of 
the doctrine of double effect: the distinction between those consequences 
of God’s plan that are intended from those that are merely foreseen. Just 
because God foresees that a certain general policy will result in specific 
harms for specific creatures, it doesn’t follow that God must intend those 
harms, nor (a fortiori) that God must intend those specific harms for the 
sake of specific benefits. Hasker may assume that God’s love for and jus-
tice toward individuals would require some compensating benefit to each 
creature to whom some specific harm is foreseen, but this neglects the pos-
sibility that the very identity of that creature might be essentially tied to 
the set of God’s actual general policies and to a set of causally prior condi-
tions, in such a way that it is metaphysically impossible for that creature to 
exist without running afoul of that specific harm. (See Robert M. Adams’s 
“Evil and Self-Identity.”9)
9“Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil,” Noûs 13 (1979), 53–65.
Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seven­
teenth Century, by Maria Rosa Antognazza. Trans. Gerald Parks. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. xxv + 322pp. $60 hardcover.
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington University
Leibniz is universally acknowledged as one of the great philosophers, 
but his writings on Christian doctrines have been largely ignored. Partly 
this is a function of the interests of the philosophers who have written 
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about him, but it also reflects the difficulty of accessing the sources for his 
theological ideas. Maria Rosa Antognazza has taken a large step towards 
remedying this neglect with her exhaustively researched monograph on 
Leibniz’s views concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation, as well as on 
the closely related topic of faith and reason. One result of her work should 
be to quell any remaining suspicion that Leibniz’s belief in these doctrines 
of orthodox Christianity was other than sincere. Leibniz could be less 
than candid about his views when he thought a more explicit statement 
might cause offense, and sometimes in discussion he entertained favor-
ably ideas that he did not actually accept, when he hoped those ideas 
might render his overall view more acceptable to an interlocutor. (See 
Robert Adams’s Leibniz.) But the notion that he could have sustained an 
interest in explaining and defending the doctrines of Trinity and Incar-
nation throughout his lifetime, and in many diverse writings, merely as 
some sort of diplomatic maneuver, is simply incredible. His sincerity is 
underscored in that at certain points he rejected views that were com-
monly accepted in his own Lutheran church, in favor of those held in 
the Reformed communion. (For instance, he opposed the doctrine of the 
communicatio idiomatum, the “communication of attributes” between the 
two natures of Christ, which was generally accepted by Lutheran theo-
logians but not by the Reformed.) Antognazza writes, “That Leibniz was 
serious about theology (and . . . the theology of the Trinity in particular) 
is immediately obvious to anyone who reads Leibniz’s work without the 
distorting lens of modern priorities” (5). She points out that his doctri-
nal views remained quite consistent throughout his lifetime. At the same 
time, the theological discussion called into play many of the central ideas 
of Leibniz’s philosophy, and so the explanations of theological doctrines 
gradually developed along with the philosophy. She upholds the claim 
that “Leibniz’s views on the Trinitarian nature of God and the metaphysi-
cal structure of the universe are neither contradictory nor unconnected 
but, rather, coexist comfortably in Leibniz’s thought, perhaps even rein-
forcing one another” (xx).
Leibniz’s writings on Trinity and Incarnation were for the most part 
called forth by the Socinian controversy, which continued throughout his 
lifetime. These writings provide a helpful window through which to ob-
serve the varying stages of this controversy, which has received little or 
no attention during the recent discussions of Trinitarian doctrine. Perhaps 
special interest will attach to the controversy with the English Socinians 
(they were the first to call themselves “Unitarians”), with whom Leibniz 
was occupied beginning about 1690. Reading about the variety of Trini-
tarian views at this time, one who has followed the recent discussions 
might be led to ask what is new under the sun? There were the “Latin 
Trinitarians” (as we would now call them) such as John Wallis, who were 
accused (rightly or wrongly) of modalism and Sabellianism. There were 
the “Social Trinitarians” such as William Sherlock, accused in their turn 
of being tritheists. Only the labels, one might say, are actually new! There 
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were also the antitrinitarians, such as Stephen Nye, who mounted vigor-
ous criticisms of all the Trinitarian views on offer.
Leibniz’s response to this English controversy begins by emphasiz-
ing the absolute monotheism of the Christian religion. There cannot be 
three absolute, infinite, omnipotent, eternal, and sovereignly perfect 
substances, since this would mean three gods. Subordination ism, which 
holds that the Son and the Holy Spirit are divine in some lesser sense than 
the Father, is also rejected. And Sabellian modalism, in which the persons 
of the Trinity are three names or three aspects of one and the same being, 
is unacceptable. It is necessary to hold that “the Father is God, the Son is 
God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and each one of these is not the other; and 
that, with all this, there are not three gods but only one God” (103). This, 
however, appears to be a contradiction, which is something that must 
absolutely be avoided. Leibniz’s way of avoiding it is to say that the word 
“God” is used differently in the different contexts: “Therefore one must 
say that in the first case the word ‘God’ is understood as a person of the 
divinity, of which there are three, and in the second case as an absolute 
substance that is unique” (103). In this way Leibniz is able to assert, con-
trary to the Socinians, that the doctrine of the Trinity has not been shown to 
be contradictory.
What has been said so far, however, is largely negative; is it possible 
to go further by way of an explanation of the doctrine? Leibniz expresses 
a preference for staying with the language in which the doctrine has 
been stated by scripture and the church. Nevertheless, he feels the need 
to provide something of a positive explanation, and in doing so the cat-
egory of relation becomes important. He does not hold that the persons 
are relations, as has sometimes been said, but they are constituted through 
relations. “One should then say that there are relations within the divine 
substance that distinguish the persons from each other; since these per-
sons cannot be absolute substances. But one should also say that these 
relations must be substantial and that they are not sufficiently explained 
by simple modalities. Also one should say that the divine persons are not 
the same concrete being under different denominations or relations, as 
one man could be both a poet and an orator; but three different concrete 
relative beings in a single absolute concrete being” (107).
Leibniz admits that we know of no example in nature that corresponds 
exactly to what is said of the divine persons. But we don’t need such an 
example: “the divine substance has without doubt privileges that go be-
yond every other substance” (107). The best analogy that can be found, 
he thinks, is the Augustinian analogy of the mind and its knowledge of 
itself—or, as he also states, “power, knowledge, and will, or love” (110). 
However he recognizes the limitations of this analogy (as did Augustine 
himself), and states, “I do not at all undertake to claim that the difference 
between the three divine persons is no greater than that between ‘that 
which understands’ and ‘that which is understood’ when a finite spirit 
thinks about itself” (109).
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This review will not attempt to determine to what extent Leibniz’s ex-
planation of the Trinity is satisfactory. Perhaps enough has been said, how-
ever, to enable the reader to see why this doctrine raises important issues 
concerning the relationship of faith and reason. These issues are specially 
relevant because the Trinity and the Incarnation are prime examples of the 
category of theological doctrines known as “mysteries”—doctrines which 
have traditionally been said to be “above reason” but not “contrary to rea-
son.” This traditional view was opposed both by the Socinian rationalists 
and by pietists such as Pierre Bayle, both of whom in effect collapsed the 
distinction between “above reason” and “against reason.” The rationalists 
accordingly rejected as irrational any doctrine not certified by rational ar-
gument; the pietists maintained that, in the case of revealed truths, reason 
should be rejected in favor of faith.
Leibniz’s position was more subtle. In recognizing the status of Trinity 
and Incarnation as mysteries he gives up (as have almost all theologians) 
any possibility of demonstrating the truth of these doctrines by rational 
argument. Instead, he invokes on their behalf a “presumption of truth” 
based on their attestation in revelation and in the tradition of the universal 
church. (Compare the “presumption of innocence” recognized in law.) This 
presumption is however defeasible, so the arguments of opponents must 
be attended to. To be sure, arguments asserting merely that the Trinity (for 
instance) is improbable have little force; it was never claimed to begin with 
that this doctrine is probable from the standpoint of unaided human rea-
son. But if the doctrine could be shown to be contradictory, this would be a 
proof of its falsehood and the doctrine would have to be given up.
But this leads to yet another difficulty: how can reason demonstrate 
the noncontradictoriness, and thus the possibility, of a doctrine which is 
admitted to exceed its powers of comprehension? There is no example in 
nature of the precise sort of multiplicity in unity that is found in the Trin-
ity. A formal demonstration of consistency could be given if the doctrine 
could be “reduced to its elements, that is, into other terms whose possibil-
ity is known.” But this cannot be done: “the application to the mysteries 
of an a priori demonstration [of possibility] would imply the complete 
elimination of the suprarational sphere, in that it would coincide with ad-
equate knowledge” (xvi). Put differently, we simply do not understand 
the mysteries well enough to reduce them to their logical elements in the 
way described.
Leibniz’s response to this dilemma is to adopt the “strategy of defense.” 
Given the presumption of truth, the burden of proof shifts to the oppo-
nents of the doctrines in question. And this means that a general proof 
of possibility or noncontradictoriness is not required; it is sufficient to 
meet the arguments of the opponents, and to show that they have not 
succeeded in demonstrating the impossibility or the contradictoriness of 
the Trinity and the Incarnation. Accordingly, this is the task Leibniz sets 
himself—as we have already seen, in a greatly abbreviated form, in the 
discussion given above.
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In order for us to believe these doctrines, however, it is not sufficient 
(though it is necessary) to refute the charge that they are contradictory. We 
must also have a grasp of the meaning of the formulas we endorse—but 
how is this possible, given that the mysteries exceed the power of human 
reason to comprehend? Leibniz’s answer is that “although one cannot ar-
rive at an adequate comprehension of the mysteries, in order for these to 
be justifiably placed in the cognitive sphere it is sufficient to have a con-
fused knowledge of their meaning. . . . Leibniz readily acknowledges that 
we do not have a clear and distinct knowledge of the concepts of ‘nature,’ 
substance,’ and ‘person’ when they are used with reference to the divine 
sphere. Yet our use of them, even when it is extended to the explanation 
of the mystery of the Trinity, is nevertheless justified precisely because 
knowledge is not limited to what is clear and distinct. However imperfect 
and inadequate the resulting explanations may be, one should not forgo 
them” (xix).
We are all indebted to Professor Antognazza for her lovingly crafted 
monograph. It should prove to be indispensable for students of Leibniz, 
and a valuable resource for all those who consider the doctrines of Trinity 
and Incarnation as well as the relationship between faith and reason.
Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn, by Paul Weithman. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 379pp. $65.00 cloth.
TERENCE CUNEO, University of Vermont
John Rawls is famous for having formulated the most influential account 
of justice in contemporary philosophy and then, shortly thereafter, having 
backed away from it. Why did Rawls change his mind about justice? In 
the Introduction to Political Liberalism (PL), Rawls offers an explanation. 
Rawls writes that we must see the changes he made to the position de-
fended in A Theory of Justice “as arising from trying to resolve a serious 
problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that the ac-
count of stability in part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as 
a whole. I believe all the differences are consequences of removing that 
inconsistency” (PL, xv–xvi).
According to the dominant reading of Rawls, the “inconsistency” to 
which Rawls refers is this. An overarching aim in Theory is to present an 
account of justice that could form the basis for a stable liberal democracy. 
However, the account he offers—justice as fairness—is broadly Kantian. 
But in a well-ordered liberal democracy, there is reasonable pluralism 
regarding comprehensive perspectives. Because of this pluralism, jus-
tice as fairness is much too controversial to serve as the shared basis of 
the principles of justice in a liberal democracy; it is, after all, the expres-
sion of yet another comprehensive perspective. Rawls’s solution to this 
